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cross the Middle East and North Africa, corrupt dictator-
ships are currently being swept away with astonishing 
speed. To fulfill the democratic promise of this wave of authori-
tarian collapse, these nations must build political systems 
committed to pluralism, the rule of law, and representative 
government.1 The adherence to written constitutional rules 
that structure and limit the exercise of political power is cen-
tral to this mission.2 But how can these countries transform 
written constitutional rules into a “respect-worthy” form of 
higher law that can actually limit the power of government?3 
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 1. Kenneth M. Pollack, The Arab Militaries: The Double-Edged Swords, 
in THE ARAB AWAKENING: AMERICA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE MIDDLE 
EAST 64 (2011) (discussing need for America to stress rule of law, civil rights, 
and representative government to key Middle Eastern constituencies). 
 2. CASS SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 6–8 
(2002); STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 6 (1995) (“A constitution is an instrument of govern-
ment. It establishes rules that help put democracy into effect. It creates an 
institutional framework that, if it functions properly, makes decision making 
more thoughtful and mistakes easier to learn from and correct.”); Michel 
Rosenfeld, Modern Constitutionalism as Interplay Between Identity and Di-
versity: An Introduction, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 497, 497, 508–9 (1993) (arguing 
that “the realization of the spirit of constitutionalism generally goes hand in 
hand with the implementation of a written constitution.”). See also Vicki 
Jackson, What’s In A Name? Reflections on Timing, Naming, and Constitu-
tion-Making, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1249, 1254 (2008). 
 3. Frank Michelman devised the concept of a “respect-worthy” constitu-
tion. See Frank Michelman, Is the Constitution a Contract for Legitimacy?, 8 
REV. CONST. STUD. 101, 125–28 (2003). Jack Balkin describes Michelman’s 
concept of respect-worthy as 
something more than merely legal validity in a positivist sense, and 
something less than complete justice. Rather, legitimacy is a feature 
of legal systems that makes them worthy of respect, so that people 
living in legitimate legal systems have reasons to accept the use of 
A
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Or, in other words, how can these countries make new demo-
cratic constitutions “matter”? 
The scholarly answer focuses on the process of constitution-
making.4 It argues that written constitutional rules “matter” 
when they are drafted and ratified during a period of extraor-
dinary popular mobilization. In this process of “popular consti-
tution-making,” constitutional drafting and ratification neces-
sarily involves irregular mechanisms of extraordinary popular 
mobilization, such as extra-parliamentary constitutional con-
ventions and referendums.5 By operating outside the rules and 
institutions of ordinary politics, the people will be able to act in 
their sovereign capacity as the “constituent power.”6 In this 
constituent position, the people themselves become the author 
of constitutional rules, maximizing the democratic “legitimacy” 
                                                                                                             
state coercion to enforce laws that they do not necessarily agree with 
and may even think quite unjust. 
Jack M. Balkin, Respect-Worthy: Frank Michelman and the Legitimate Con-
stitution, 39 TULSA L. REV. 485, 486 (2004). 
 4. Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins, & Justin Blount, Does the Process of 
Constitution-Making Matter? 5 ANNU. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 201, 210 (2009) (sur-
veying literature on process of constitution-making). Scholars first began to 
consider the best process of constitution-making in response to the wave of 
constitution-making after the fall of communism. See infra note 9. 
 5. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION 47–51 (1991) 
[hereinafter ACKERMAN, LIBERAL REVOLUTION]. Ackerman draws his belief in 
the importance of a higher and more popular “track” for constitution-making 
from his reading of American constitutional history. See, 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, 
WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6 (1991). A link between popular mobilization 
and constitution-making is widely held. See also Angela M. Banks, Expand-
ing Participation in Constitution-making: Challenges and Opportunities, 49 
WM & MARY L. REV. 1043 (2008); Kirsti Samuels, Post-Conflict Peace-Building 
and Constitution-Making, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 663, 670 (2006) (“The use of more 
participatory and inclusive processes to broaden the constitutional agenda 
and prevent the process from degenerating into a mere division of spoils be-
tween powerful players.”). A belief in the importance of direct popular partic-
ipation in constitution-making is also currently widespread amongst democ-
racy-promoting, non-governmental organizations. See, e.g., Jason Gluck, 
Egypt, Tunisia, and the Constitutional Movement, U.S. INST. OF PEACE (Feb. 
28, 2011), http://www.usip.org/publications/egypt-tunisia-and-the-
constitutional-movement. Gluck suggests that “[a]ll components of society 
should be included in the constitutional discussion.” Id. 
 6. EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYES, WHAT IS THE THIRD ESTATE? 121–22 (S.E. 
Finer ed., M. Blondel trans., Pall Mall Press 1963) (1789). 
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of these rules and transforming them into a form of higher 
law.7 
Popular constitution-making is grounded on the belief that a 
successful process of constitution-making must be separated 
from ordinary politics. This view is so deeply ingrained that a 
recent article found that “[n]early all the normative and posi-
tive work on constitutions proceeds from the assumption that 
constitutional politics are fundamentally different in character 
from ordinary politics.”8 In constructing a normative agenda for 
post-authoritarian constitution-making, scholars and commen-
tators have drawn on this belief to encourage new democracies 
to deploy extraordinary popular mechanisms such as constitu-
tional conventions and referendums in their constitution-
making process.9 
The experience of constitution-making in post-Communist 
Europe and Asia, however, challenges this scholarly consensus. 
First, many Central and Eastern European post-Communist 
countries have established strong systems of constitutional re-
view without using popular mechanisms to draft and ratify 
their constitutions. Instead, they used inherited, Communist-
era institutions and related rules to draft their new constitu-
tions, a process that Andrew Arato calls “parliamentary consti-
tution-making.”10 In these countries, “[c]onstitutional change 
was so closely associated with political change that it implied a 
constitutional politics not readily distinguishable from ordinary 
politics.”11 The relative success of this form of parliamentary 
                                                                                                             
 7. This is an author-based theory of “legitimacy,” where a constitution is 
“respect-worthy” because of who drafted it. And, arguably, the most demo-
cratically “legitimate” author of a democratic constitution is the people them-
selves. For more, see Michelman, supra note 3, at 125–28. 
 8. Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins & Justin Blount, Does the Process of 
Constitution-Making Matter?, 5 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 201, 210 (2009). 
 9. ACKERMAN, LIBERAL REVOLUTION, supra note 5, at 47–51; Jon Elster, 
Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE L.J. 
364, 395 (1995) [hereinafter Elster, Forces and Mechanisms]; Laurel E. Mil-
ler, Designing Constitution-Making Processes: Lessons from the Past, Ques-
tions for the Future, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE 
STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION-MAKING 601, 612 (Laurel E. Miller ed., 2010); see 
also supra note 5. 
 10. See, e.g., Andrew Arato, Parliamentary Constitution Making in Hunga-
ry, 4 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 45, 45–47 (1995). 
 11. Ruti Teitel, Transnational Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political 
Transformation, 106 YALE L.J. 2009, 2069 (1997). 
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constitution-making in building constitutional orders that lim-
ited political power and protected individual rights has led 
some scholars to formulate a new “legal” model for democratic 
constitutional adoption.12 
Second, and more disturbingly, the mechanisms and rhetoric 
of popular constitution-making have not produced constitutions 
that limit the concentration of power and protect individual 
liberty in the post-Communist world. Instead, irregular popu-
lar mechanisms like referendums and constitutional conven-
tions have helped charismatic presidents unilaterally impose 
authoritarian constitutions on society.13 As Stephen Holmes 
and Cass Sunstein describe it, “the greater role granted to pop-
ular referenda and extra-parliamentary authorities, the less 
constitutionalism matters as a political force.”14 
This Article will explore why popular constitution-making 
has led to constitutional dictatorship. Part I will detail the the-
oretical underpinnings of popular constitution-making.15 Part 
II will describe how many Eastern European countries rejected 
popular constitution-making and instead drafted new constitu-
tions through ordinary political processes and within the pre-
existing legal system.16 Part III will demonstrate how popular 
constitution-making has helped undermine constitutionalism 
by providing opportunities for charismatic politicians with little 
desire for constitutionally-limited government to appeal to the 
people. Claiming to be the agent of the people, these charis-
matic figures were then able to justify their decisions to side-
step parliamentary opposition and push through “authoritarian 
constitutions” that concentrated vast power in their own 
hands.17 Part IV will conclude by stressing the importance of 
stable rules and institutions in constraining the constitution-
making process.   
                                                                                                             
 12. Luis Lopez Guerra, Application of the Spanish Model in the Constitu-
tional Transitions in Central and Eastern Europe, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1937, 
1939–40 (1998). 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. Stephen Holmes & Cass Sunstein, The Politics of Constitutional Revi-
sion in Eastern Europe, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 275, 290 (Sanford Levinson ed., 
1995). 
 15. See infra Part I. 
 16. See infra Part II. 
 17. See infra Part III. 
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I. POPULAR CONSTITUTION-MAKING AND THE PEOPLE’S 
CONSTITUENT POWER 
Anarchy is a frightening but necessary transitional stage; the 
only moment in which a new order of things can be created. It 
is not in calm times that one can take uniform measures.18 
As post-Communist countries began to draft new democratic 
constitutions in the late 1980s and early 1990s, political scien-
tists and constitutional theorists focused on a largely neglected 
question at the intersection of constitutional and democratic 
theory: How can new democracies increase the likelihood that 
new written constitutional rules will—in contrast to their au-
thoritarian-era predecessors—create binding constitutional law 
that can limit governmental power?19 This field of inquiry was 
entirely new in the early 1990s. Writing in 1992, Bruce Acker-
man deplored the lack of a “powerful literature” that described 
how “[a] piece of paper calling itself a constitution can be . . . a 
profound act of political self-definition.”20 
To address this question, theorists began by considering 
strategies for boosting the “democratic legitimacy” or “respect-
worthiness” of a new democratic constitution.21 Hesitant to rec-
ommend specific constitutional content, theorists focused pure-
ly on an ideal process of constitutional foundation that would 
ensure that the new constitution was generated by the true 
sovereign power in a democracy, the people. This “author-
based” version of constitutional legitimacy would ensure that 
the constitution would be respect-worthy by connecting “the 
revolutionary will of the people” to “the making of a constitu-
tion.”22 
                                                                                                             
 18. Jon Elster, Constitutional Bootstrapping in Philadelphia and Paris, 14 
CARDOZO L. REV. 549, 557–58 (1993) (quoting CLERMONT-TONNERRE, 9 
ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES SÉRIE I: 1789–1799 461 (1875–88)). 
 19. Rett R. Ludwikowski, The Beginning of the Constitutional Era: A Bi-
centennial Comparative Study of the American and French Constitutions, 11 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 167, 168 (1989) (discussing concept of “constitutional engi-
neering” as method for determining ways to develop constitutionalism in 
countries with little history of constitutional discourse). 
 20. ACKERMAN, LIBERAL REVOLUTION, supra note 5, at 47. 
 21. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 3, at 125–28. 
 22. URLICH KLAUSS PREUSS, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION: THE LINK 
BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONALISM AND PROGRESS 2–3 (Deborah Lucas Schneider 
trans., 1995). See also Joel Colon-Rios, The Legitimacy of the Juridical: Con-
stituent Power, Democracy, and the Dilemmas of Constitutional Reform, 48 
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This author-based approach drew heavily on the concept of 
“constituent power” developed by the French theorist Emman-
uel Joseph Sieyes.23 Sieyes’s theory held that the people—or as 
he termed it, “the Nation”—act in two capacities in a democra-
cy. The Nation most often acts through ordinary institutions 
and elected representatives within pre-established rules. In 
exceptional situations, however, the Nation exercises its sover-
eign “constituent power” (pouvoir constituant) to repudiate ex-
isting legality and establish a new government of “constituted 
powers” (pouvoir constitue), such as a parliament, an executive, 
or courts.24 A truly democratic constitution, unlike legislation, 
is therefore the product of an exceptional moment of popular 
mobilization in which the monolithic mass of the Nation direct-
ly creates a new constitutional order.25 
                                                                                                             
OSGOODE HALL L. J. 199, 215 (2010) (“[T]he basic condition for democratic 
legitimacy is the realization of democracy at the level of the fundamental 
laws—that ordinary citizens have the real possibility of participating in the 
re-constitution of the norms that govern the state through highly participa-
tory procedures. In other words, the democratic legitimacy of a constitutional 
regime depends on the way in which it approaches the question of constituent 
power.”). For more on the link between revolutionary thought and this theory 
of popular constitution-making, see William Partlett, Liberal Revolution, Le-
gality, and the Russian Founding Period, REV. CEN. & E. EUR. L. (forthcoming 
2013). 
 23. See SIEYES, supra note 6, at 136–39. The American revolutionaries also 
drew on the concept of popular sovereignty as the basis for new constitutional 
law. They were, however, more cautious in exercising that power. James 
Madison wrote that the people’s exercise of constituent power is of “too tick-
lish a nature to be unnecessarily multiplied.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 341 
(James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). John Adams commented that 
“[i]t is certain, in theory, that the only moral foundation of government is, the 
consent of the people. But to what extent shall we carry this principle?” Let-
ter from John Adams to James Sullivan (May 26, 1776), in 9 THE WORKS OF 
JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A LIFE OF THE 
AUTHOR, NOTES, AND ILLUSTRATIONS 375 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1854). 
 24. SIEYES, supra note 6, at 136–39. Sieyes therefore had a unitary vision 
of popular sovereignty. Sieyes saw natural law as a limit on the constituent 
power of the Nation. See Colon-Rios, supra note 22, at 205–206. 
 25. SIEYES, supra note 6, at 136–37. This theory of constitutional legitima-
cy is grounded on social contract theory and sees constitutions as a special 
kind of contract between the people and their government. “Social contract 
theory imagines political societies as resting on a fundamental agreement, 
adopted at a discrete moment in hypothetical time, that both bound individu-
al persons together into a single polity and set fundamental rules regarding 
that polity’s structure and powers.” Jacob T. Levy, Not So Novus an Ordo: 
Constitutions Without Social Contracts, 37 POL. THEORY 191, 192 (2009) 
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Popular constitution-making theory draws its inspiration 
from Sieyes’s belief that popular sovereignty is synonymous 
with the unitary concept of the nation.26 It stands for the prin-
ciple that for the people to truly act, they must do so outside of 
the ordinary, pre-existing rules or institutional subdivisions 
inherited from the old regime.27 Instead, they must act as a na-
tional whole. This disregard for pre-existing legality and insti-
tutions is not a problem; it instead creates the basis or “politi-
cal bottom”28 for a new democratic constitution.29 Illegal revolu-
                                                                                                             
(providing further background on social contract theory). This theory there-
fore draws on enlightenment thinking that sees constitution-making as the 
product of the people’s rational will. 
 26. Bruce Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
1164, 1182 (1988) (discussing national referendum process as best way for 
capturing vision for constitutional change “handed down to us by the Found-
ers.”). American legal scholars have argued that the American founders 
shared a unitary vision of popular sovereignty. Akhil Amar argues that the 
concept that “sovereignty was absolute and indivisible” was “almost univer-
sally held in the 1780s.”  The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional 
Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 507 (1994). Richard 
Kay described how the American founders invoked “a well-developed theory 
of constituent authority according to which the people’s will was both anterior 
and superior to every instance of positive law, not excluding any constitu-
tional text.” Constituent Authority, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 715, 718 (2011). 
 27. This sentiment was best summed up in Thomas Paine’s proclamation 
that “[t]he constitution of a country is not the act of its government, but of the 
people constituting a government.” THOMAS PAINE, Rights of Man: Being an 
Answer to Mr. Burke’s Attack on the French Revolution, in RIGHTS OF MAN, 
COMMON SENSE AND OTHER POLITICAL WRITINGS 83, 122 (1791).  
 28. Richard S. Kay, The Illegality of the Constitution, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 
57, 58 (1987). 
 29. Id. (stating “it is exactly its break with prior legality that invested the 
Constitution with the power it still exercises over [Americans] and with its, 
at least formal, primacy in our legal system.”). See also James Gray Pope, 
Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American Con-
stitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 296, 303–04 (1990); 2 BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 14–15 (1998). It is important 
to note that popular constitution-making was a contested idea during the 
American founding period. Gordon S. Wood, Foreword: State Constitution-
Making in the American Revolution, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 911, 922–23 (1993) 
(stating that in the immediate aftermath of the Revolutionary War, “many 
Americans . . . continued to believe that their legislatures were the best in-
struments for interpreting and changing these constitutions. The state legis-
latures represented the people, and the people, it seemed, could scarcely tyr-
annize themselves.” Wood then shows how this view shifted radically in the 
1780s.). 
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tionary constitutional foundation is therefore a virtue: To enjoy 
the status as legally binding higher law, constitutional founda-
tion must be separated from the ordinary laws and conventions 
of ordinary politics. 
A. A Revolutionary Agenda for Capturing the People’s Constitu-
ent Power 
As Communism collapsed, commentators drew on popular 
constitution-making to formulate a normative agenda for post-
Communist constitutional adoption.30 Popular constitution-
making lent itself well to post-Communist constitutional crea-
tion because it linked the revolutionary street protests in city 
squares across the former Communist countries to the creation 
of binding constitutional law.31 Seen as products of the masses 
of newly liberated post-Communist people, new constitutional 
rules would be protected “against erosion by political elites who 
had failed to gain broad and deep popular support for their in-
novations.”32 
To build binding new constitutional law, commentators there-
fore stridently opposed parliamentary constitution-making or 
adherence to pre-existing constitutional rules. These commen-
tators instead argued that new democracies should turn to ir-
regular institutions such as constituent assemblies and popular 
referendums, which could capture the collective voice of the 
Nation.33 This extraordinary process would help foster the le-
                                                                                                             
 30. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. This interest was also wide-
spread amongst non-legal commentators. See, e.g.,  RALF DAHREHNDORF, 
REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN EUROPE 91 (1991) (commenting that 
“[a]fter the constitution, normal politics takes over.”). 
 31. See supra note 9. Other potential theories of constitutional legitimacy 
were not as appealing. For instance, foundationalism—the concept that post-
Communist constitutional legitimacy would be drawn from constitutions with 
certain democratic provisions—was rejected for being too elitist. Further-
more, the Burkean historicism belief in gradual constitutional change placed 
too much emphasis on these countries’ illiberal history. Finally, monism—the 
idea that elected legislatures should generate constitutional law—was seen 
as too easily overturned by temporary majorities. For more, see ACKERMAN, 
supra note 5, at 3–33 (analyzing competing theories of constitutional legiti-
macy). 
 32. ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 10. 
 33. See supra note 30. Donald Lutz explained that “[the] doctrine of popu-
lar sovereignty required that constitutions be written by a popularly selected 
convention, rather than the legislature, and then ratified through a process 
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gitimacy of the new written constitution, placing it above ordi-
nary politics. As two leading political scientists put it, “[t]he 
optimal formula [is] one in . . . which the work of the constitu-
ent assembly gains further legitimacy by being approved in a 
popular referendum . . . .”34 
Bruce Ackerman, “America’s greatest theorist of transition,” 
has described this popular constitution-making agenda in de-
tail.35 Ackerman strongly urged post-Communist drafters to 
avoid “a series of ad hoc modifications of the older Communist 
texts” through parliamentary amendment.36 Instead, he ar-
gued, constitutional drafters should aspire “to attempt a com-
prehensive statement of their revolutionary principles.”37 Call-
ing this the “triumphalist scenario,” Ackerman argued that ap-
pealing to the people would lead to the constitutionalization of 
post-Communist revolutionary fervor.38 
To draft a new constitution, Ackerman suggested that post-
Communist constitutional drafters should convene a constitu-
tional convention to capture the people’s true constituent pow-
er.39 Although newly elected post-Communist legislatures were 
unlikely to legally authorize these irregular institutions, 
Ackerman was not worried.40 Instead, he argued that the extra-
legal nature of these bodies accorded them important symbolic 
value, as had been in the case in the United States: 
To them, the legally anomalous character of the “convention” 
was not a sign of defective legal status but of revolutionary 
possibility—that a group of patriots might speak for the Peo-
ple with greater political legitimacy than any assembly whose 
                                                                                                             
that elicited popular consent—ideally, in a referendum.” Donald S. Lutz, To-
ward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355, 355 
(1994). 
 34. JUAN J. LINZ & ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION 
AND CONSOLIDATION: SOUTHERN EUROPE, SOUTH AMERICA, AND POST-
COMMUNIST EUROPE 82–83 (1996). 
 35. Sanford Levinson, Transition, 108 YALE L.J. 2215, 2215 (1999). 
Ackerman’s concept of “dualist democracy” recreates Sieyes’s two-track ap-
proach. Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 
YALE L.J. 453, 461–462 (1989). 
 36. ACKERMAN, LIBERAL REVOLUTION, supra note 5, at 61. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV 
771, 780–87(1997). 
 39. ACKERMAN, LIBERAL REVOLUTION, supra note 5, at 51–54. 
 40. Id. at 53. 
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authority arose only from its legal form. . . . As the revolu-
tionary years moved on, Americans insisted that the People 
could deliberate on constitutional matters only in special bod-
ies whose very name— “convention”—denied that legal forms 
could ultimately substitute for the engaged participation of 
citizens. 41 
Ackerman also argued that popular referendums should be 
an important part of the constitution-making process. He be-
lieved that referendums echoed the spirit of the American Rev-
olution where the drafters “appealed for support from the Peo-
ple over the heads of existing governments.”42 In particular, a 
referendum would be critical in ensuring that the constitution 
would serve as “a popular symbol of the revolutionary genera-
tion’s achievement”43 and would capture a “mandate from the 
people.”44 
To mobilize popular opinion around these irregular institu-
tions, Ackerman called for strong charismatic presidential 
leadership.45 In particular, Ackerman pushed for the constitu-
tionalization of presidential charisma to avoid a constitution 
with “soft constitutional norms” that would be “too easy for a 
parliamentary majority” to ignore.46 Consequently, he encour-
aged Russian President Boris Yeltsin to refuse to “strike a 
deal” with the members of the elected Russian Parliament and 
instead encouraged him to “use the impasse [with parliament]” 
to catalyze popular opinion behind a new democratic constitu-
tion.47 
Jon Elster, the leading political scientist to address this field 
of constitution-making, drew on the insights of political science 
in support of popular constitution-making. Using eighteenth-
century French and American history as examples, he rea-
                                                                                                             
 41. ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 175 (emphasis in original). 
 42. ACKERMAN, LIBERAL REVOLUTION, supra note 5, at 53. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 54 (citation omitted). 
 45. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: 
JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 143–47 
(2005). (Ackerman’s full exposition on advantages of plebiscitary presidential-
ism). Ackerman’s calls for the constitutionalization of presidential charisma 
also echo Max Weber’s earlier calls for charismatic leadership. See ANDREAS 
KALYVAS, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLITICS OF THE EXTRAORDINARY: MAX WEBER, 
CARL SCHMITT, AND HANNAH ARENDT 65, 207 (2008). 
 46. ACKERMAN, LIBERAL REVOLUTION, supra note 5, at 63. 
 47. Id. at 58–59. 
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soned, “constitutions ought to be written by specially convened 
assemblies and not by bodies that also serve as ordinary legis-
latures. Nor should the legislatures be given a central place in 
the process of ratification.”48 
Elster argued that an irregular constitutional convention, in 
contrast to an ordinary legislature, was far more likely to be an 
impartial body of deep deliberation necessary for constitution-
making. For Elster, the irregular nature of these institutions 
would help insulate the process of constitution-making from 
the taint of short-term political bargaining.49 He reasoned that 
conventions “promote the predominance of reason over inter-
est”50 because “the pressure on speakers to produce impartial 
arguments may be especially strong in the constitutional set-
ting, compared to ordinary legislatures.”51 This production of a 
more principled decision would help ensure a more apolitical 
and legitimate constitution. Without taking such an irregular 
path, “a constitution will lack legitimacy to the extent that it is 
perceived to be a mere bargain among interest groups rather 
than the outcome of rational argument about the common 
good.”52 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION BY MIXING ORDINARY AND 
EXTRAORDINARY POLITICS  
This new trend towards peaceful transition is puzzling be-
cause it raises serious questions about the accepted wisdom 
that genuine transitions to constitutional democracy require a 
violent tear in the political fabric and a radical shift in the 
polity’s conception of its own identity.53 
A large number of Central and East European countries have 
been successful in constructing constitutional democracy with-
                                                                                                             
 48. Elster, Forces and Mechanisms, supra note 9, at 370–71, 395. 
 49. Jon Elster, Legislatures as Constituent Assemblies, in THE LEAST 
EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 
181, 185 (Richard W. Bauman and Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006). 
 50. Id. (emphasis in original).  
 51. Jon Elster, Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies, 2 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 345, 419–20 (2000). 
 52. Jon Elster, Constitution Making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the 
Boat in the Open Sea, 71 PUB. ADMIN. 169, 179 (1993). 
 53. Michel Rosenfeld, Constitution-Making, Identity Building, and Peace-
ful Transition to Democracy: Theoretical Reflections Inspired by the Spanish 
Example, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1891, 1893–94 (1998). 
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out employing the mechanisms and rhetoric of popular consti-
tution-making.54 These countries consciously rejected revolu-
tionary mechanisms in favor of negotiated paths to constitu-
tional foundation. For instance, a “high-ranking Hungarian ju-
rist . . . remarked that even enthusiastic supporters,” of politi-
cal change in Hungary “avoid[ed] the term ‘revolution,’ prefer-
ring to speak of ‘peaceful transition’ instead.”55 As Andrew Ara-
to observed, Central and Eastern European constitutional 
drafters sought to avoid a “state of nature, outside of all law by 
postulating constitutional continuity with old regimes.”56 
As a result, Central and East European countries actively 
avoided revolutionary attempts at popular constitution-
making. In Hungary, a pro-presidential group “presented a pe-
tition with 200,000 signatures calling on parliament to hold a 
referendum which would decide,” whether to introduce direct 
presidential elections and also whether to shift “some powers 
from the government to the president.”57 The Hungarian Par-
liament rejected this option after the Constitutional Court 
ruled that the “constitution cannot be amended by referenda.”58 
Similarly, when Albanian President Sali Berisha’s constitu-
tional draft, which faced criticism for its authoritarian tenden-
cies, failed to gain the necessary support in the parliament, 
President Berisha attempted to circumvent the Albanian Par-
liament and put his draft to a referendum.59 The Constitutional 
Court in Albania ruled “that submitting the constitution to a 
popular vote without first asking parliament to vote violated 
the Law on Major Constitutional Provisions.”60 Finally, in Po-
land, a center-right party “drummed up half-a-million signa-
tures and demanded a parallel referendum on their version of 
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the civic constitution.”61 The Polish parliament successfully 
blocked this attempt to appeal to the people through irregular 
processes.62 
Instead, the Central and East European countries amended 
and established new constitutional orders by combining ordi-
nary and extraordinary institutional mechanisms.63 Ordinary 
parliaments became the locus for both ordinary legislation and 
constitutional lawmaking, linking an emerging culture of civil 
engagement through parliamentary-based politics to the crea-
tion of constitutions.64 These newly empowered parliaments 
created commissions, consisting of both legal experts and 
members of parliament, to draft the post-Communist constitu-
tions under the standing rules set forth in their parliamentary 
tradition. These drafts were only given to the people in a refer-
endum after parliamentary ratification in accordance with pro-
cedures inherited from amended Communist-era constitu-
tions.65 This use of parliamentarian rules to fundamentally re-
shape the constitutional order meant that “[w]holly new politi-
cal arrangements [were] institutionalized throughout the re-
gion on the basis of a string of constitutional amendments 
passed by weakly legitimate parliaments, assemblies that are, 
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Influenced by the popular constitution-making literature, 
scholars and commentators argued that the Central and East-
ern European rejection of popular constitution-making jeopard-
ized the super-legality of constitutional law. In particular, they 
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“condemn[ed] easy paths to constitutional modification in East-
ern Europe . . . and [] denounce[d] more generally the ‘confu-
sion’ between constitutional politics and ordinary politics char-
acteristic of every post-Communist society.”74 Andrew Arato 
questioned whether the “democratic legitimacy of a constitu-
tional construction created through continuity with a rejected 
old regime can be significantly reconstructed mid-stream with-
out damage to constitutionalism.”75 Lloyd Cutler argued that 
ordinary legislatures should not ratify constitutions because, “if 
the legislature is the final word, the legislature can always 
change the constitution” and the process will not lead to “a true 
legitimization of the constitution.”76 He criticized the German 
Constitution for being “simply an act, a so-called basic law of 
the legislature,” which is, “something that also plagues how [a 
country] go[es] about building a constitution in that part of the 
world.”77 Peter Quint also argued that there would be “a price 
to be paid” for Germany’s decision to incorporate East Germa-
ny, the German Democratic Republic, without a constituent 
assembly, stating: 
The drafters thereby relinquished the powerful democratic 
process of education and deliberation that such a procedure 
would have afforded—even if the Basic Law had not been sig-
nificantly altered—as well as an attendant increase in demo-
cratic legitimacy. . . [i]f there had been a constituent assembly 
under Article 146 leading to a new constitution, there might 
have been a greater sense of a common political enterprise 
than there now is.78 
A. E. Dick Howard also criticized Central and Eastern Euro-
pean drafters for failing to draw on the people’s constituent 
power in the creation of a new constitution. He found it to be a 
“paradox” that “[t]he device of the constitutional convention or 
constituent assembly is not used” while “referenda are quite 
rare.”79 Additionally, Jon Elster lamented Central and Europe-
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an drafters’ failure to raise the constitution above the whims of 
everyday ordinary politics, warning that “[t]he constitution will 
lose many of its desirable properties—notably that of inspiring 
confidence and creating a climate in which investors are willing 
to make long-term investments—if everyone expects that it will 
be continually revised.”80 
These worries, however, have proven to be overstated. With 
the exception of Hungary, which recently ratified a constitution 
criticized for rolling back democratic freedoms, other Central 
and Eastern European countries have built stable constitution-
al orders by mixing ordinary and irregular political mecha-
nisms in the constitution-making process.81 The relative suc-
cess of these countries’ transitions to their new constitutions 
might suggest that a constitutional order does not draw its “re-
spect-worthiness” solely from the process of constitution-
making.82 
Scholars have begun to acknowledge that mixing ordinary 
and extraordinary mechanisms in constitution-making pre-
sents an alternate route to constitutionalism.83 Cass Sunstein 
and Stephen Holmes argued that although “a sharp split” be-
tween constitution-making and ordinary politics is “preferable”, 
the “peculiar conditions of Eastern Europe do not make this a 
sensible solution.”84 They conclude that “the very creation of a 
constitutional culture in post-Communist societies depend[ed] 
upon a willingness to mix constitutional politics and ordinary 
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politics.”85 Similarly, Vicki Jackson noted “that democratic le-
gitimacy can emerge through a range of processes, including 
those formally controlled by less than fully legitimate govern-
ments or by occupying military authorities from liberal democ-
racies.”86 Ruti Teitel, seeking to explain what she described as 
a “puzzling conflation of ordinary politics and constitution-
making,” hypothesized that transitions have their own unique 
characteristics, requiring the creation of a “transitional juris-
prudence.”87 Teitel, however, admitted that the understanding 
of this special kind of jurisprudence remains incomplete, con-
ceding that the “constitutional component of [her] project 
points to a research agenda, which should be challenging of 
some of the meta-theoretical predicates of the prevailing consti-
tutional canon.”88 
III. POPULAR CONSTITUTION-MAKING AND AUTHORITARIAN 
CONSTITUTIONS 
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The legally anomalous and extra-parliamentary mechanisms 
and rhetoric of popular constitution-making, however, did play 
an important role in post-Communist constitution-making fur-
ther east. In the former Soviet Union, these irregular and pop-
ular mechanisms emerged as a useful tool for power-hungry 
politicians bent on reasserting personal leadership but unable 
to risk the domestic and international costs of openly autocratic 
rule amidst a post-Cold War global democratic “zeitgeist.” Con-
sequently, these post-Communist figures manipulated referen-
dums and produced highly choreographed constitutional con-
ventions to delegitimize ordinary constitutional rules and insti-
tutions such as parliaments, and to constitutionalize presiden-
tial dictatorship.92 In other words, the mechanisms of constitu-
ent power helped cloak the creation of plebiscitary dictatorship 
in the garb of liberal constitutionalism. Russia’s process of 
post-Soviet constitutional foundation is the paradigmatic ex-
ample.  
A. Russia 
Russia initially followed the “parliamentary” model of consti-
tution-making. By 1992, the Russian parliament had amended 
the Communist-era constitution numerous times and created a 
constitutional document that bore little resemblance to its So-
viet-era counterpart.93 Most importantly, the constitution no 
longer contained any reference to the Communist Party’s mo-
nopoly on power and instead established a constitutional sys-
tem of parliamentary supremacy with an elected president and 
a constitutional court.94 
The two-tiered Russian parliament emerged at the center of 
this new constitutional system. At the base of this two-tiered 
system was the Congress of People’s Deputies (“Congress”), a 
body that was elected in March 1990 and comprised of 1,098 
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members.95 The Congress had the power to amend the constitu-
tion, pass laws, elect a chairman, and approve the head of gov-
ernment as well as other state officials.96 The Congress, there-
fore, was “like a constituent assembly, which assumes control 
of the state temporarily in a time of crisis in order to lay the 
constitutional foundations of a new political order.”97 To govern 
between its meetings, the Congress elected a permanent stand-
ing body, the Supreme Soviet.98 
Both the Supreme Soviet and the Congress became important 
arenas for political debate and criticism. In fact, as Yeltsin’s 
rapid economic reforms grew increasingly unpopular, these 
representative bodies became a key point of opposition.99 The 
Supreme Soviet also emerged as a focal point for constitution-
making, creating a Constitutional Commission under the lead-
ership of Oleg Rumiantsev. Rumiantsev was a leading Russian 
westernizer; he had convened a discussion group, Democratic 
Perestroika, which was one of Moscow’s many such small, in-
formal political discussion groups.100 Mr. Rumiantsev’s draft 
constitution ultimately sought to draw on this advice to create 
a western-style semi-presidential system in Russia.101 
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1. The Russian Constitutional Court 
The newly created Russian Constitutional Court emerged as 
a surprisingly powerful body in enforcing the amended Com-
munist-era Russian Constitution. Under the energetic leader-
ship of Chairman Valerii Zorkin, the Court attempted to en-
sure that the new amendments, which proclaimed separation of 
powers and law-based limitations on government, were ade-
quately enforced.102 In its first case, the Court struck down a 
presidential decree seeking to merge the Internal Police and 
the Foreign Intelligence Service. The Court opened this deci-
sion with a broad statement that “[o]ne of the fundamental 
principles of a constitutional system is that each government 
institution may only make decisions and carry out actions that 
are within its competency, determined in the Constitution.”103 
The Court went on to state that “[t]he President is not able to 
contradict the Constitution and the laws of the Russian Feder-
ation or the elements of a system of checks and balances, un-
derpinned by the principle of separation of powers based in Ar-
ticle 3 of the Russian Declaration of Sovereignty.”104 The Zorkin 
Court did not just limit presidential power, later decisions also 
struck down unconstitutional extensions of power by the Rus-
sian Parliament.105 
Zorkin’s attempts to enforce Russia’s amended constitutional 
system were complicated because much of the Russian political 
elite were unaccustomed to constitutional limitations on the 
practice of political power. As Zorkin explained in a speech to 
the Congress in the spring of 1992, many officials in both the 
presidential and parliamentary branches of power were unwill-
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ing to respect the limitations placed on their behavior by the 
existing constitution.106 
2. Yeltsin’s Visions of Presidentially-Dominated Form of  
Government 
The first elected president, Boris Yeltsin, and his supporters 
were hostile to constitutional limits on presidential power. 
They saw a truly democratic constitutional order as one with 
an elected president as the supreme institution.107 In a speech 
to the parliament, Yeltsin described the underlying centrality 
of presidential dominance in Russian democracy, asserting, “I 
am a strong proponent of presidential power. But not because I 
am president, but because without the presidency Russia 
would not survive . . . because the president is elected by the 
entire people, he embodies the integrity and unity of Russia.”108 
One of Yeltsin’s aides outlined the presidential administra-
tion’s vision of presidential power. He explained that the Rus-
sian president differs from the presidency: 
imagined in textbooks or in its classical form. The fundamen-
tal concept of the presidency is as the superior power. The 
presidency ensures the idea of an independent and responsi-
ble Government, formed in order to decide questions of gov-
ernmental operation. And the presidency ensures that the 
Government works with the regional legislatures in the crea-
tion of a single governmental vertical.109 
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This aide insisted that this system was democratic because of 
its basis in popular sovereignty, or narodovlastie.110 In other 
words, the Russian Presidency’s power flowed directly from its 
embodiment of the people’s constituent power. 
3. Yeltsin’s De-Legitimization of Existing Political Institutions 
This view of superior presidential power conflicted with Rus-
sia’s amended Communist-era constitution. Thus, it was only a 
matter of time before the president would come into conflict 
with constitutional legality and its two chief institutions, the 
Constitutional Court and the parliament. In this struggle, 
Yeltsin repeatedly attempted to argue that both the Constitu-
tional Court and the parliament were Communist-era relics 
that did not represent the people’s newfound constituent pow-
er.111 
This feud began in earnest at the end of 1992 when President 
Yeltsin demanded that Congress renew his expansive decree 
powers so that he could continue his macroeconomic reforms.112 
Without these powers, the Presidency could no longer fulfill the 
presidential administration’s expansive view of “proper” presi-
dential power. As Congress debated whether to renew the dele-
gation of these powers to Yeltsin, rumors circulated of a presi-
dential coup d’état.113 In a December 10, 1992 speech to the 
Congress, President Yeltsin attacked the existing constitution 
for affording too much power to the legislature, protesting, 
“[t]he constitution, or what has become of it, is turning the Su-
preme Soviet, its leadership and its Chairman into the absolute 
rulers of Russia . . . [they are] accustomed to giving orders 
without being accountable.”114 Drawing on the language of 
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popular constitution-making, he called for the people to decide 
the nature of this constitutional system directly, 
In this situation, I consider it necessary to appeal directly to 
the citizens of Russia, to all the voters. To those who voted for 
me in the election and thanks to whom I became President of 
Russia. . . . The Congress and the President have but one 
judge—the people. . . . My proposal is based on the constitu-
tional principle of people’s rule, on the President’s constitu-
tional right to appeal to the people, and on the President’s 
constitutional right of legislative initiative.115 
As Yeltsin stepped up these attacks and it seemed that Rus-
sia was on the brink of civil war, Chairman Zorkin stepped in 
to broker a compromise. He was ultimately successful. Presi-
dent Yeltsin and the leader of parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov, 
reached a compromise—Khasbulatov agreed to a referendum in 
April 1993 in return for Yeltsin’s agreement to choose a Prime 
Minister from the three candidates having the broadest sup-
port in the Congress.116 
In January 1993, the leader of the Russian parliament, real-
izing the dangerous ramifications of allowing Yeltsin a popular 
mandate in a popular referendum, attempted to back away 
from this promise. He argued that a referendum was simply an 
appeal to mob rule and a way to “distract public opinion from 
the truth, to separate people into the ‘just’ (supporters of the 
strengthening of presidential power) and the ‘unjust’ (‘the anti-
reformers’ and ‘all those reactionary Deputies’), and to estab-
lish some type of dictatorial regime (a regime of mob rule).”117 
As the constitutional debate raged on, the Congress met 
again in March 1993.118 The leader of parliament warned that 
Yeltsin’s appeals to the people’s constituent power “devalue the 
existing Constitution, destabilize the political situation . . . 
[and] have a certain logic, which consists, apparently, in imply-
ing that the potential for carrying out ultraradical reforms by 
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constitutional, democratic methods have been exhausted.”119 
The Congress responded by stripping Yeltsin of his extraordi-
nary powers,120 reducing the Russian Presidency to its textual 
role as head of the executive branch in a formal semi-
presidential, separation-of-powers system.121 
Yeltsin refused to accept this arrangement. In a March 20th 
televised speech, he called for “special administrative rule, a 
condition in which the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of 
People’s Deputies would be subordinated to the president and 
would not have the right to cancel his decrees or to pass laws 
contradicting them.”122 In support of this coup, he argued that 
the Congress was undermining the people’s ability to realize 
their constituent power: 
The eighth Congress was, in point of fact, a dress rehearsal 
for revenge by members of former Party nomenklatura. They 
simply want to deceive the people. We hear them lie in the 
oaths of loyalty to the Constitution that they continually take; 
from Congress to Congress, that document is bent and re-
shaped in their own interests, and blow after blow is dealt to 
the very foundation of the constitutional system of popular 
sovereignty [(narodovlastie)].123 
This move, however, met stiff resistance; the existing consti-
tutional rules still commanded respect. Most importantly, the 
head of the Russian Armed Forces spoke out against Yeltsin’s 
speech in a hastily convened session of the Presiding Commit-
tee of the Supreme Soviet, saying that the Armed Forces would 
not participate in political infighting and would follow the con-
stitution.124 The Constitutional Court convened a special ses-
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sion on March 21st and, by the morning of March 22nd, had 
declared Yeltsin’s speech unconstitutional.125 The Congress also 
met on March 21st and called an emergency session for March 
26th.126 Yeltsin backed down when he saw that his attempt at a 
rupture in legality was not going to be successful; the published 
decree from his speech on March 24th deleted any mention of 
“special administrative rule.”127 
The Congress convened a special session on March 28th to 
consider Yeltsin’s impeachment and the referendum.128 In Red 
Square, Yeltsin gave a speech to a crowd of supporters claiming 
that the impeachment vote did not matter because he would 
only submit to the “verdict of the people.”129 66 percent of the 
deputies called for his impeachment, uncomfortably close to the 
75 percent needed. The deputies also voted to hold a referen-
dum on April 25, 1993.130 Yeltsin’s political luck had held; he 
now would have his chance to appeal to the limitless constitu-
ent power of the people. 
4. The April Referendum 
The Congress approved four questions for the April 25th ref-
erendum, asking the Russian people:131 
1. Do you have confidence in Boris Yeltsin, the President of 
Russia? 
2. Do you approve of the social and economic policy of the 
President of Russia and of Russia’s government since 1992? 
3. Do you consider early presidential elections necessary? 
4. Do you consider early elections for the full Parliament nec-
essary? 
After a dispute between parliamentary members and the pres-
ident, the Constitutional Court ruled that the first two ques-
tions did not have “legal significance” and therefore would not 
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make any legal changes to the constitution.132 Yeltsin’s team, 
however, ignored this decision. For them, a mandate from the 
people transcended any pre-existing rules or institutions. As 
one of Yeltsin’s closest constitutional advisors, Sergei 
Shakhrai, stated “[i]f the president receives a vote of confidence 
on the first referendum question while on the fourth question 
the electorate votes for early elections for the People’s Depu-
ties, he will fully implement the provisions in his March 20 tel-
evised address to the people.”133 
After a fierce political campaign, 58.05% of voters in the ref-
erendum expressed their confidence in Boris Yeltsin’s leader-
ship.134 Despite the Constitutional Court’s decision, Yeltsin’s 
team immediately capitalized on these results. Yeltsin pro-
claimed that “[t]he Russian Soviet Federation Socialist Repub-
lic has been peacefully replaced by the Russian Federation. The 
state has changed its legal identity,”135 A key Yeltsin advisor 
held a press conference and proclaimed that the Congress could 
no longer remove the president from his post, force the gov-
ernment to resign, or adopt a new constitution.136 Asked what 
would happen if the Congress failed to comply, he said “[t]he 
president and the government received a vote of confidence in 
the referendum. They will conduct the economic reform on the 
basis of their own decisions.”137 The message from the Yeltsin 
Administration was clear—no pre-existing institution or rule 
could limit the supreme force of the Russian people’s constitu-
ent power. 
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To realize his popular mandate and formalize its transforma-
tive effects, Yeltsin convened an appointed constitutional con-
vention. Yeltsin saw this extralegal body, which unlike the 
Congress was unelected, as a kind of proto-legislature that 
would replace the sitting parliament.138 He commented that 
“[i]t seem[ed] to [him] that the constitutional convention can be 
transferred into a Federation Council and will be one of the 
houses of parliament.”139 Parliamentary delegates were not 
welcome. For instance, after trying to take the podium in the 
early days of the Convention, Khasbulatov was shouted down 
by the audience, after which he led seventy representatives 
from local parliaments in walking out and in calling the confer-
ence a sham.140 The sessions of the Constitutional Convention 
were closed, and only the working commission could approve 
changes to the constitution. The working commission was a 
smaller body comprised of Yeltsin’s closest advisors and re-
gional executives who saw Yeltsin’s desire to eliminate legisla-
tive power as a way of increasing their own power in the re-
gions.141 
5. Legitimizing Extra-legality 
The Constitutional Convention eventually produced a consti-
tution that formalized the Yeltsin Administration’s authoritar-
ian vision for Russia’s constitutional system. In order to avoid 
any parliamentary checks, the Constitutional Convention 
placed the president above the system of separated power.142 As 
the embodiment of the people and the head of the unitary state, 
the president was the “guarantor” of the constitution and en-
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sured the harmonious interaction of the branches.143 The text 
contained very few limitations on presidential power. 
Unsurprisingly, neither parliament nor the regional parlia-
ments were eager to ratify this new constitution. Refusing to 
compromise with the parliament, which had written its own 
draft constitution based on Western constitutionalism, Yeltsin 
issued a decree on September 21, 1993 disbanding the Russian 
Parliament and all regional parliaments, and prohibiting the 
Constitutional Court from meeting.144 The decree suspended 
any parts of the existing constitution that contradicted the de-
cree. The decree claimed legitimacy from the parliament’s “di-
rect opposition to the will of the people, reflected in the refer-
endum of April 25, 1993. . . [which] had the highest possible 
legal force across the entire Russian nation.”145 Yeltsin was 
making the classic constituent power argument: Both the par-
liament and constitution under which it drew its powers were 
illegitimate because they had opposed the people’s sovereign 
constituent power. 
As they had done in March, both parliament and the Consti-
tutional Court reacted immediately. The Constitutional Court 
declared Yeltsin’s decree unconstitutional and authorized the 
legislature to impeach Yeltsin under the existing constitution 
for attempting to illegally disperse a lawfully enacted repre-
sentative body.146 The parliament swore Aleksandr Rutskoi in 
as the new president and he began issuing decrees.147 President 
Rutskoi also called for a mass strike to resist Yeltsin’s uncon-
stitutional actions, and a tense standoff ensued. Yeltsin, in his 
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own memoir, remembered how close he was to losing control of 
the country at this point.148 
As power hung in the balance, Yeltsin’s team worked furious-
ly to establish the legitimacy of his dissolution of parliament 
and proroguing of the Constitutional Court both domestically 
and internationally. The central argument in this effort was 
that President Yeltsin had acted in accordance with the con-
stituent power and therefore his actions had been legitimate, if 
not technically legal.149 For instance, the Ministry of Justice 
issued a statement after the dissolution of parliament seeking 
to justify Yeltsin’s actions: “[Although the president] acted be-
yond the legal framework, he acted in accordance with the con-
stitutional principles of government by the people, and to pro-
tect the will of the people.”150 
Yeltsin also sought to shore up his international backers. In a 
speech to an audience in the United States, one of Yeltsin’s ad-
visors attacked the Russian Parliament for defying the people. 
He claimed: 
[T]he Congress of People’s Deputies [parliament] simply was 
unable to comprehend any rule of law higher than constitu-
tional law, and that the Congress is unable to distinguish 
constitutional law from constitutional principles. The princi-
ples expressed in the current Constitution have never 
achieved the level of being ‘constitutional.’ Instead, the Con-
stitution of the Russian Federation itself might be unconstitu-
tional. This idea is based upon the simple notion that the cur-
rent Constitution expresses principles that are in direct con-
flict with the will of the Russian people.151 
In contrast to Yeltsin’s failed coup attempt in March, Yelt-
sin’s September decree was far more successful in marshaling 
support amongst key Yeltsin constituencies in three ways. 
First, Yeltsin’s “victory” in the April referendum helped him 
obtain key support from the most powerful player in the inter-
national community: the United States. During the tense 
standoff between Yeltsin and the parliament, United States 
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officials gave their full backing to Yeltsin, arranging for a large 
economic package to help support him.152 United States gov-
ernment officials used the language of constituent power-based, 
extraordinary politics to justify this support. The Senate major-
ity leader, George Mitchell of Maine, said that Yeltsin’s actions 
were justified because they were “consistent with the views of 
the overwhelming majority of the Russian people.”153 Lee Ham-
ilton, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, de-
scribed the existing Russian Constitution as “unworkable” and 
that the April referendum “stated the clear preference of the 
Russian people for early elections and for the Yeltsin re-
forms.”154 
Second, key opinion leaders in the United States media also 
drew on the language of constituent power to justify Yeltsin’s 
actions. A New York Times editorial supported Yeltsin’s ac-
tions: 
Mr. Yeltsin can claim a degree of rough-and-ready democratic 
legitimacy for his decrees. His 1991 election as President rep-
resented a fuller democratic choice than the 1990 parliamen-
tary elections, in which many Kremlin-endorsed candidates 
ran unopposed. Just this past April, a national plebiscite con-
ferred a fresh vote of confidence on the President and, most 
importantly, endorsed the early dissolution of Parliament. 
Given the lack of constitutional clarity, that vote gives Mr. 
Yeltsin moral authority to act as he did.155 
Another influential New York Times columnist, Serge Schme-
mann, relied on the concept of popular constitution-making to 
describe, how “a constitution itself could be ‘unconstitutional’ if 
it served only a small clique, that ‘the people’ was not only a 
rhetorical flourish, that a popularly elected president might 
have higher moral authority than a legal but dysfunctional as-
sembly.”156 
Third, Yeltsin also enjoyed domestic support. A 1993 public 
survey found that 50% of Russians believed that Yeltsin had 
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been justified in using military force to “control the situa-
tion.”157 Most importantly, as the regional assemblies remained 
largely on the sidelines, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev reluc-
tantly complied with Yeltsin’s order to suppress street level 
disturbances and forcibly disband the parliament.158 Only a few 
thousand Russians took to the streets in support of the existing 
constitutional legality; Yeltsin’s attempts to delegitimize the 
previous system had proven successful. 
6. An Authoritarian Constitution 
As Yeltsin assumed his position as dictator in the absence of 
an elected parliament or constitutional court, he quickly 
worked to solidify his new position by ratifying a new constitu-
tion. Consequently, he signed a decree stating that he would 
place a draft constitution before the Russian people in a nation-
wide referendum set for December 12, 1993.159 He once again 
sought to justify this decision by appealing to the constituent 
power of the people: 
[r]ecognizing the unshakable nature of people’s rule as the 
foundation of the Russian Federation’s constitutional system, 
cognizant of the fact that the repository and sole source of 
power in the Russian Federation is its multinational people, 
and with a view to implementing the people’s right to directly 
resolve the most important questions of the life of the state . . 
. .160 
Yeltsin published the official Draft Constitution on November 
9, 1993.161 Although many western commentators focused on 
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its long list of individual rights, the key provisions ensured 
that there were no constitutional limits on presidential pow-
er.162 The presidency remained outside the tripartite system of 
separated powers, exercising a fourth type of “presidential 
power,” and enjoyed significant control over each of the three 
subordinate branches of government.163 First, the President 
had a virtual monopoly over executive power. Article 111 (4) of 
the Constitution provided that if the lower house of the parlia-
ment (the Duma) rejected the president’s choice of Prime Min-
ister to lead the government, the president was then required 
to appoint a Prime Minister and dissolve the Duma.164 Fur-
thermore, the president had the power to annul any executive 
branch edicts.165  
Second, the president held significant constitutional power to 
control the legislative branch of the government. This was par-
ticularly true with regard to the upper house of the Russian 
Parliament, the Federation Council.166 Article 95 (2) stated that 
the Federation Council was comprised of “two representatives 
from each of Russia’s subjects: one from the executive branch 
and one from the legislative branch.”167 Furthermore, according 
to Article 77 (2), the bodies of executive power in the federal 
center and in the regions formed a “unified system of executive 
power.”168 Because of the president’s monopoly over the execu-
tive branch, one-half of the “senators” in the Federation Coun-
cil were therefore subordinated to the president. This subordi-
nation was deliberate because Yeltsin had originally seen the 
Federation Council as only a consultative body that would help 
the Russian president exert power in the regions.169 In order to 
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ensure that the Federation Council would remain in this simp-
ly advisory role, Yeltsin personally intervened in the final days 
before releasing the draft and “insisted that the Federation 
Council be “formed” rather than “elected” as originally envi-
sioned by the Constitutional Convention.170 In making this 
change, Yeltsin hoped to ensure that this powerful body, which 
had the power to veto bills passed by the lower house and to 
confirm all judicial appointments, would stay out of party poli-
tics and remain subordinated to the presidential apparatus.171 
As the Chairman of the Federation Council said in 1999, “the 
upper house of the Federal Assembly is an element of stability; 
in a period of abrupt change it protects the country from social 
upheaval. For the first time in the history of Russia, a non-
political organ has emerged which influences state policy and 
stands by the people.”172 
Third, the president had full control over the judicial branch 
of government. The president appointed all of the judges to 
both the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court with the 
consent of the Federation Council.173 Because the Federation 
Council was under presidential control, the president’s ap-
pointment power was essentially unchecked. 
On December 12, 1993, this authoritarian constitution re-
ceived a slight majority in a national referendum. In the after-
math of constitutionalizing his vision of a presidential republic, 
Yeltsin used the language of popular constitution-making to 
describe the ratification, declaring, “[a] popular mandate to 
strengthen the system of government has been received.” “No 
matter whom the voters cast their ballots for, they were agreed 
on one point: Russia needs strong rule, Russia needs order, 
people are irritated by the amorphous nature of power, they 
are tired of inconsistent and halfhearted decisions, and they 
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are exasperated by the rise in crime.”174Yeltsin’s aides were not 
shy about the nature of the constitutional system that they had 
created. One aide 
admitted that the illusion of a smooth and swift transfer from 
a dictatorship to a free-market democracy is gone. . . . Now 
the talk is of a transitional regime of ‘enlightened authoritar-
ianism’ or ‘guided democracy’ or some such hybrid that makes 
no secret of the need for a prolonged concentration of power in 
the presidency.”175 
B. Belarus and Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan and Belarus initially ratified their post-
Communist constitutions through parliamentary constitution-
making. As the success of Yeltsin’s extralegal actions resonated 
across the post-Soviet space, however, presidents in these 
countries, who shared Yeltsin’s disdain for limitations on pres-
idential power, exploited the rhetoric and mechanisms of popu-
lar constitution-making to assert, and legitimize, their own 
presidentially dominated, authoritarian constitutions. 
1. Belarus 
The Belarusian Parliament drafted Belarus’s first post-Soviet 
constitution. The process began in November 1991, when the 
parliament’s Constitutional Commission submitted a draft con-
stitution to the Belarus Parliament.176 The most debated aspect 
of the constitution surrounded the creation of an elected presi-
dent. On one side, the Speaker of the Belarus Parliament, him-
self a frontrunner for the presidency, warned against introduc-
ing a president for “at least another three years” in order to en-
sure that “the parliament should shape up and help strengthen 
existing democratic institutions.”177 On the other, nationalist 
political parties argued that, “[e]conomic, legal, and adminis-
trative chaos required a strong state and a strong executive.”178 
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After numerous drafts, on March 15, 1994, the parliament fi-
nally ratified a compromise creating a strong president by a 
margin of four votes.179 The newly established office of the pres-
ident was given significant constitutional powers, becoming the 
head of state and the head of the executive.180 This new consti-
tution also created an independent parliament, which was the 
“highest representative, standing, and sole legislative body of 
state power” and had the power to elect the judges to the Con-
stitutional Court.181 Most importantly, the president could not 
dissolve the parliament.182 
Soon after ratification of the new constitution, Belarus elect-
ed Aleksandr Lukashenko as its first President.  Lukashenko 
was no democrat, however, and shared Yeltsin’s view that po-
litical power should be concentrated in the Presidency. As par-
liament became a major source of opposition to Lukashenko’s 
policies, he increasingly moved to limit parliamentary power. 
In a 1995 interview on state media, President Lukashenko ar-
gued that Belarus had a similar history to Germany and there-
fore needed a strong leader to bring it out of its profound politi-
cal and economic crisis. He stated that “German history teach-
es that the leading role of the president at [that] stage in histo-
ry was critical and indisputable . . . .”183 Echoing President 
Yeltsin’s conception of the presidency, Lukashenko stated later 
in a speech that his ideal constitution had “‘three branches of 
power; legislative, executive, and judicial. And all these 
branches grow on the tree of the presidency.’”184 
A year after his election, Lukashenko began to draw on the 
rhetoric and mechanisms of popular constitution-making to ad-
vance his authoritarian vision of a presidentially dominated 
constitutional system. “In the spring of 1995, [he] demanded 
the right to dissolve parliament,” and illegally added that issue 
to a national referendum on the national symbols of Belarus.185 
He also began issuing decrees that encroached on parliamen-
tary powers, justifying these actions on the idea that the presi-
dent cannot issue an illegal decree because of his status as the 
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direct representative of the people.186 A former Belarusian 
Constitutional Court Judge described how “lawyers in the pres-
ident’s circle referred to the ‘theory of legal laws.’”187 This ap-
proach was based on the belief that “the president automatical-
ly knew better because he was popularly elected” and that “[i]f 
a law contradicts the public mood and the intentions of the 
president, on the other hand, it is ‘non-legal’ and may be ig-
nored.”188 
Parliament resisted Lukashenko’s attempts to weaken its 
powers. It issued a proclamation that Lukashenko’s statements 
regarding “his unwillingness to obey the constitution and the 
law, his disrespect and insult of other branches of power, first 
of all the Supreme Soviet, his promises to introduce ‘direct 
presidential rule’ show that the process of damaging the foun-
dations of law and civic stability has begun.”189 In 1996, par-
liament promoted a “Movement in Support of the Constitution,” 
which demanded “support for the rule of law and the decisions 
of the Constitutional Court.”190 The previously disparate politi-
cal parties in parliament also began to coalesce in opposition to 
Lukashenko’s utter disregard for legality.191 Civil society was 
beginning to rally around Belarus’ ordinary political institu-
tions. In May 1996, the parliament threatened to refuse to ap-
prove Lukashenko’s ministers; in return, Lukashenko appoint-
ed them anyway.192 
As in Russia, the newly created Belarusian Constitutional 
Court worked alongside parliament to counter President 
Lukashenko’s actions, and “[i]n 1995, the Court examined 14 
Presidential decrees and ruled 11 of them illegal.”193 In re-
sponse, Lukashenko pledged to ignore Constitutional Court de-
cisions and demanded that the Constitutional Court Chief Jus-
tice resign.194 Several months later, “Lukashenko issued a de-
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cree “obliging government and local authorities to carry out all 
his previous decrees and disregard the rulings of the Constitu-
tional Court.”195 
As the standoff devolved into a constitutional crisis, 
Lukashenko exploited the rhetoric of popular constitution-
making and called for a referendum to ask the people, among 
other questions, whether Belarus should adopt the 1994 consti-
tution with “those changes and additions proposed by President 
Lukashenko?”196 The changes included new powers for the 
president to appoint the majority of Constitutional Court judg-
es and the creation of a bicameral legislature where the presi-
dent would appoint one-third of the legislators in the upper 
house.197 Parliament countered by adding its own proposed 
changes to the constitution that would abolish the post of pres-
ident altogether.198 
Seeking to serve as intermediary, the Constitutional Court 
issued a ruling that neither amendment should be decided by 
referendum, warning that Belarus “‘is a young state and such 
hasty and ill-thought out moves can only worsen the political 
situation.’”199 The chairman of the Constitutional Court also 
cautioned parliament about the dangers that Lukashenko’s 
changes posed to the constitution, stating “[t]omorrow we will 
have a totalitarian regime in the centre of Europe—complete 
with a castrated parliament and Constitutional court.”200 
As the crisis deepened and the likelihood of violence in-
creased, Russian officials stepped in to help broker a compro-
mise. These officials, however, ended up taking a pro-
Lukashenko stance. Yeltsin called the Speaker of the Belarus-
ian Parliament and warned him “not to mess with the presi-
dent.”201 The powerful mayor of Moscow and the leader of one 
of the Parliament’s largest parties sided with Lukashenko. Ul-
timately, Lukashenko “agreed that the referendum’s results 
would be consultative rather than binding [and] parliament 
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agreed to halt the impeachment proceedings” and schedule the 
referendum.202 
Prior to the referendum, Lukashenko saturated the official 
mass media with pro-presidential propaganda.203 This media 
strategy worked; ultimately, 77.6% of the populace supported 
Lukashenko’s pro-presidential changes to the constitution.204 
Although these results were technically non-binding, it was 
impossible to resist the bare political logic of a broad-based 
popular mandate for presidential power. In political reality, the 
legitimacy of a popular mandate obliterated any attempts to 
maintain legality. Citing the results of this referendum, 
Lukashenko immediately dissolved the parliament.205 
Ruling as a dictator, Lukashenko scheduled a new referen-
dum for November 1996 to introduce an entirely new constitu-
tion.206 This constitution would create, as Lukashenko main-
tained, a “real separation of powers.”207 This nation-wide refer-
endum was also a success for the president, as a majority of the 
populace ratified a new constitution “establishing a semi-
authoritarian regime.”208 Lukashenko’s new constitution gave 
the Belarusian president powers similar to those of the Russian 
president, including a virtual monopoly of executive power, a 
stronghold on the upper house of the parliament, and complete 
control of the judicial branch. Lukashenko therefore had fol-
lowed the Yeltsin model, making wide use of the mechanisms 
and rhetoric of popular constitution-making to justify his elim-
ination of parliament and the ratification of a presidentially 
dominated, authoritarian constitution. 
2. Kazakhstan: Managed Democracy 
In contrast to Belarus and Russia, Kazakhstan’s president, 
Nursaltan Nazarbaev, dominated the early period of constitu-
tion-making. The former leader of the Kazakh Communist Par-
ty, Nazarbaev had made a quick transition to electoral politics 
in the post-Communist period. In December 1991, 95% of Ka-
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zakhs elected Nazarbaev to the presidency, largely because no 
one had been permitted to run against him. 209 
After Kazakhstan gained independence in 1992, President 
Nazarbaev understood the importance of writing a new consti-
tution and appointed a working commission to draft one.210 
Nazarbaev was not a proponent of pluralistic electoral democ-
racy. Instead, he envisioned the president as the manager of 
political life and valued economic reform before democratic re-
form, stating that, “[i]n this vitally important sphere [of the 
economy] there is no room for an orgy of democracy.”211 He 
went on to comment that “the stabilization of the economy and 
the transition to the market demand a categorical ban on any 
party, political, or ideological interference in this process.”212 
Nazarbaev’s working commission produced a draft constitu-
tion in June 1992, establishing a strongly presidential form of 
government.213 President Nazarbaev’s appointed commission 
tightly controlled the debate throughout, the most contentious 
question being whether Kazakhstan’s national language would 
be Russian or Kazakh.214 The Kazakh Parliament obediently 
adopted this draft on January 28, 1993.215 This new constitu-
tion established a system of government with a very strong 
president, positioning him as the guarantor of rights and liber-
ties and of the constitution itself.216 The constitution created a 
parliament but gave the president wide appointment power 
“from the chief executives responsible for implementation of 
policy down to the lowest level of government.”217 Although 
weak, the parliament still possessed the right to amend the 
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constitution by a supermajority, and was the highest repre-
sentative body in the nation.218 
As time went on, the Kazakh Parliament began to exercise its 
limited powers. In particular, it began “to develop some of the 
fundamental characteristics of an institution capable of provid-
ing the checks and balances essential to the functioning of a 
pluralistic society.”219 Underlying this parliamentary opposi-
tion was unhappiness with Nazarbaev’s macroeconomic policy, 
which had led to a “flailing economy that sported a 2,500 per-
cent annual inflation rate.”220 
In May 1994, the parliament took the unprecedented step of 
giving Nazarbaev’s Prime Minister a vote of “no confidence.”221 
In July, parliament was able to override Nazarbaev’s veto of 
two consumer-friendly bills.222 The Speaker of the parliament 
also began to see an important role for the parliament in Ka-
zakhstan’s system of political government. He “began holding 
the government accountable for its actions and decrees, claim-
ing that they must have a basis in law and that parliament had 
to propose and pass new legislation rather than leave the initi-
ation of legislation to the executive branch.”223 He also called on 
parliamentary members to defend a parliamentary tradition in 
Kazakhstan that “stretch[ed] back to the councils of biis of the 
fifteenth to eighteenth centuries.”224 Additionally, the parlia-
ment created a new party to ensure respect for the existing 
constitution called the “Legal Development of Kazakhstan.”225 
As in Russia and Belarus, the beginnings of a civil society were 
coalescing around the “ordinary” Kazakh parliament. 
Nazarbaev had little patience for this growing parliamentary 
opposition. Instead of dispersing the parliament by force, how-
ever, Nazarbaev chose to cloak his actions in the language of 
popular constitution-making. His first strategy was to use his 
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control of the Constitutional Court to dismiss the parliament 
“legally.”226 Unlike Russia or Belarus, the first Kazakh Consti-
tutional Court had close ties with the presidential administra-
tion.227 After playing no role in Kazakh politics since its incep-
tion, the Court unexpectedly ruled on a major electoral 
claim.228 This decision rendered the parliament invalid because 
“[a]lthough the complaint had been brought about a single vot-
ing district in Almaty, the constitutional court ruled that the 
entire 1994 parliamentary elections had been unconstitution-
al.”229 
After the decision, Nazarbaev appeared before parliament 
and declared the nullification of parliament’s popular man-
date.230 He then disbanded parliament, turning off its power, 
water, and telephone, and sending in workmen to begin remod-
eling the building.231 Ruling as a dictator, he then created his 
own handpicked People’s Assembly, which postponed the next 
presidential elections until 2000.232 Then, “[c]laiming that he 
wanted to defer to the ‘popular will,’” he held a referendum on 
the postponement of presidential elections in April 1995.233 
Nazarbaev then held another referendum to endorse the 
adoption of another constitution in August 1995, which “ex-
panded presidential power at the expense of the legislature, 
which became a largely consultative body, with legislation ini-
tiated by the president.”234 This new constitution eradicated 
any possibility of parliamentary checks on presidential pow-
er.235 Although it is likely that Nazarbaev would have found a 
way to defeat his parliamentary opponents, Nazarbaev’s deci-
sion to follow this path suggests the importance of the language 
and mechanisms of popular constitution-making in legitimizing 
the elimination of parliament and the foundation of a presiden-
tial dictatorship. 
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IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF PRE-EXISTING INSTITUTIONS OR RULES 
IN CONSTITUTION-MAKING PROCESS 
Post-Communist constitution-making vividly shows how 
charismatic executives can strategically use the populist rheto-
ric and irregular mechanisms of popular constitution-making 
to marginalize ordinary political institutions and legality.236 
Relying on appeals to the constituent power, a force “that 
bursts apart, breaks, interrupts, unhinges any pre-existing 
equilibrium and any possible continuity,”237 magnetic leaders 
have been able to convert a moment of popular endorsement 
into an opportunity to unilaterally reshape the institutional 
framework of the state and secure constitutional dictator-
ship.238 
Captured by the revolutionary potential of popular constitu-
tion-making, theorists have therefore made a critical error: 
They have failed to grasp that post-authoritarian countries 
have weak institutions. In this environment, popular constitu-
tion-making can allow an individual or party to ignore existing 
institutions and unilaterally reorganize the institutional appa-
ratus of the state in their interests by appealing to the “super-
human, irresistible ‘general will’”239 of the people’s constituent 
power (the nation). To avoid unilateral seizures of this consti-
tution-making power, constitution-making must be grounded in 
stable institutions—even at the risk of weakening popular le-
gitimacy. 
Bruce Ackerman is guilty of this error. He dismisses charges 
that popular constitution-making can “degenerate into un-
speakable tyranny with bewildering speed”240 by pointing to the 
role of extraordinary political mechanisms in fostering a deep 
“dialogue between leaders and citizenry that finally succeeds in 
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generating broad popular consent for a sharp break with the 
received wisdom of the past.”241 Popular constitution-making in 
the American Founding period, however, encouraged deep de-
liberation because of a strong network of state and local repre-
sentative institutions. These institutions tightly controlled con-
stitution-making, encouraging deliberation, negotiation, and 
compromise.242 As Willi Paul Adams observed, 
In the Whig theory of social contract, “the people” were the fi-
nal authority to which all political power reverted in cases of 
flagrant abuse of delegated governmental power. But in the 
actual assumption of political power, no unit as vast and 
amorphous as “the people” could possibly act as the vehicle of 
the political process. It was instead the remarkably stable 
territorial units of towns, cities, counties, and colonies that 
took control.243 
Modern post-authoritarian countries, however, do not have 
these networks of institutions to organize the people and con-
strain unilateral appeals to that amorphous people. As Steven 
Kotkin demonstrates, post-Communist collapse was not the re-
sult of stable institutional pressure from an organized civil so-
ciety.244 Instead, it was the product of a top-down implosion of 
the Communist party.245 This kind of implosion is common in 
post-Cold War political change, and characterizes a number of 
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political transformations in one-party states across Asia, in-
cluding Indonesia, Taiwan, and South Korea.246 Consequently, 
modern post-authoritarian societies must seek other ways to 
institutionalize popular power to avoid unilateral assertions of 
constitution-making power. 
Post-Communist countries in Eastern Europe solved this 
problem by relying on the “ordinary” rules and institutions in-
herited from the Communist era. Although this solution un-
doubtedly sacrificed democratic legitimacy, this solution high-
lights a hidden advantage of a legacy of sham constitutional-
ism.247 Given new life in free elections, this constitutional 
framework can provide a set of rules and institutions for refin-
ing and enlarging the voice of the people while also constrain-
ing unilateral appeals to an amorphous concept of a nation.248  
The lessons of post-Communist constitutionalism remain 
highly relevant across the world. Indeed, in the midst of eco-
nomic and political crisis, charismatic figures still deploy the 
mechanisms and rhetoric of constituent power to dismantle ex-
isting institutions and expand their personal power. In 
Ukraine, for instance, President Viktor Yanukovich—an advo-
cate of a Russian style presidential system in Ukraine—called 
for a referendum to overcome parliamentary opposition and 
strengthen the role of the president in Ukraine’s political sys-
tem.249 Furthermore, in Venezuela, President Hugo Chavez has 
repeatedly sought to use the mechanisms and rhetoric of con-
stitutional politics to strengthen his power.250 Finally, the lat-
est wave of authoritarian collapse in the Middle East has 
demonstrated a similar shortage of informal extralegal institu-
tions that can channel popular participation, particularly for 
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the secular parts of society.251 In these countries, successful 
constitutional lawmaking also requires institutional-based con-
stitution-making. In Egypt, the military’s decision to set the 
guidelines for the constitutional lawmaking process is an im-
portant step toward constraining any attempts at unilateral 
assertion of power by the dominant party.252 
The insights of constitutional politics in the former Com-
munist world also shed important light on American constitu-
tional law debates. In recent years, influential legal scholars 
have questioned whether Article V provides the only process for 
amending the United States Constitution.253 Without Article V 
as a guide, however, is every potential process valid as long as 
it commands the direct voice of “the nation”? For instance, 
could a charismatic United States President at a time of crisis 
rewrite the United States Constitution and put it to a nation-
wide referendum?254 The post-Communist experience shows the 
dangers of amending a constitution through a referendum; 
whether future drafters follow the procedures of Article V or 
not, the United States should continue to base constitutional 
change on stable representative institutions.255 
In sum, the post-Communist constitutional experience re-
veals the dangers of grounding a new constitution on the unor-
ganized and diffuse constituent power of “We the National Ma-
jority.”256 It therefore reminds us of a fundamental requirement 
for the constitution-making process: That there are external 
rules or institutions for ensuring the deep democratic delibera-
tion and compromise needed for a successful constitutional or-
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der.257 The use of an inherited constitutional order is just one 
method of ensuring a stable institutional basis for constitution-
making. Whatever method employed, however, it is difficult to 
avoid the simple conclusion that the process of constitutional 
lawmaking risks enabling constitutional dictatorship unless 
institutional constraints are placed on the process of constitu-
tional creation.258 
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